Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
Introduction
Responding to a bioterror event that involves contagious agents has become a major issue in the war against terror. There are many operational and logistic decisions that must be made carefully in order to effectively cope with such a threat. These decisions are roughly divided into two levels: Structural (strategic) decisions that need to be made in advance, and operational (real-time) decisions that must be made during the event.
Some of the structural (strategic) problems are:
• How many vaccines to produce and stock?
• Which supply management policies to apply for allocating, deploying, and controlling inventories of vaccines and other related supplies?
• What infrastructure (vaccination stations, quarantining facilities, etc.) is required?
• What vaccination procedure (e.g., inoculation only, pre-vaccination screening for contra indication) to adopt?
• How to determine the manpower requirements and personnel assignment?
The operational (real-time) decisions include:
• Identifying the type of the bioterror event.
• Mana ging the contact tracing process (if applied).
• Prioritizing efforts with respect to monitoring, isolating, quarantining, tracing, and vaccinating.
• Coordinating the supply chain of vaccines and other supplies.
• Identifying bottlenecks and potential congestion.
• Determining capacities and setting service rates.
One of the most critical decisions-a decision that has both structural and operational implications-is which vaccination policy to adopt. This question has generated debate among policymakers [1] and has also drawn much attention by the general public [2] , [3] .
The vaccination policy decision has two levels. At the first level, policymakers must choose between essentially two options: a preemptive approach in which the entire population is pre-vaccinated, and a "wait and see" approach where post-attack emergency response (vaccination, quarantine, isolation) commences following an outbreak of the disease. Mixtures of these two options are possible too, i.e., pre-vaccination of first responders (e.g., health-care and law-enforcement personnel) only. Sociological and psychological considerations (is there a real threat or just a perceived one?) coupled with medical considerations (fear of side effects) have hindered policy makers from taking any significant preemptive action so far.
If no significant preemptive measures are taken, the question at the second level is which post-event vaccination policy to adopt. The two policies that have been examined so far are mass vaccination and trace vaccination. In mass v accination, maximum vaccination capacity is utilized to uniformly inoculate the entire population. In trace (also called ring or targeted) vaccination, only limited vaccination capacity is utilized to selectively inoculate contacts (or suspected contacts) of infective individuals.
Several researchers have attempted to address the issue of the post-event vaccination process in the case of smallpox, and in particular to compare mass vaccination to trace vaccination. Kaplan, Craft, and Wein [4] propose a continuous-time deterministic model that comprises 17 ordinary differential equations. Their model, details of which are reported in [5] , captures many important aspects of the situation, including the "race to trace." The race to trace reflects the time constraints on the effectiveness of the vaccination process due to the limited time period in which an infective is vaccine-sensitive or "immunable." They assume exponential distributions with regard to all of the time parameters (e.g., incubation time, infectious time) and therefore the transitions in their model are not dependent on the "age" of an individual in a certain stage of the epidemic. They also ignore the effect of the epidemic initial conditions. Some epidemic and operational parameters may have different values at the early stages of the epidemic than later on. For example, the vaccination process may need some setup time during which only a portion of the potential vaccination capacity can be utilized. Also, during the first generation of the disease (prior to detection) the infection rate may be higher and the isolation rate may be lower because of lack of situational awareness.
Kaplan et al. [4] conclude that under reasonable conditions regarding the initial attack size and the epidemic's spread parameters, mass vaccination is generally more effective than trace vaccination.
Contrary to the analytic macroscopic approach in [4] , [5] , Halloran, Longini, Azhar, and Yang [6] use a detailed simulation to model at the micro level a smallpox transmission process in a (socially) structured community of 2,000 people. The disease transmission process in their model takes into account the social structure of the community, attempting to better represent the way the epidemic spreads in the population. They assume that the random variables that are associated with the duration of the various stages of the epidemic are uniformly distributed-an assumption that can hardly be justified. They assert that according to their simulation, trace vaccination would prevent more smallpox cases per dose of vaccine than would mass vaccination. Due to the imbedded nonlinearities in the epidemic process, it is not clear if their conclusions derived for a population of 2,000 may also apply to a population of say 10 million. Their model also lacks the operational and logistical aspects that are accounted for in [4] .
However, the Halloran et al. and the Kaplan et al. models are not inconsistent. The model in [4] gives similar results as the model in [6] when supplied the inputs used i n [6] (see [7] [8] to analyze various response options. Their conclusion is that only a combination of vaccination with an effective quarantine may eradicate the epidemic. The paper contains some epidemic progression data-some of which is used in our paper.
Koopman [9] reviews the models in [4] and [6] and suggests a possible third modeling approach based on a network model that describes the links among individuals. Such models are reported in [ 10] and [11] . Other researchers ( [12] , [13] ) use
distance-based models to analyze ring vaccination, which is a geographically oriented version of trace vaccination. Spatial effects are also examined in [14] , where a highresolution computational model is developed. In a more recent publication [15] , the authors develop a stochastic model of outcomes under various control policies. Their model is limited in the sense that they assume, rather than derive, the post intervention basic reproductive rate.
There are two main objectives in the current research. The first objective is to develop a flexible, large-scale analytic model that expands and generalizes previous models. Our model is conceptually similar to the model in [4] , but it differs in the use of discrete rather than continuous time. Thus, it is in the form of a set of difference equations rather than differential equations. As it will be shown later on, a discrete model can more easily capture certain key operational, logistical, and epidemiological aspects of the situation.
Also, in contrast to the constant hazard functions (exponential distributions) of the time parameters in [4] and the uniform distributions of these parameters in [6] , our model makes no assumptions with regard to these distributions. It can take any finite-support distributions-including empirical. The model also explicitly represents the age -dependent transitions among the various stages of the epidemic. We also distinguish between the initial conditions of the epidemic and its operational and logistical steady-state parameters.
The second objective is to propose an alternative vaccination policy, the prioritized vaccination policy (PVP), which may be viewed as a mixture of the mass vaccination policy (MVP) and the trace vaccination policy (TVP). We demonstrate that under a set of realistic assumptions regarding the epidemic parameters and the operational and logistical capabilities to handle it, the PVP is significantly more effective than either the MVP or the TVP individually.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the possible response options for a bioattack, and in Section 3 we present the model. The three vaccination policies-PVP, MVP, and TVP-are analyzed in Section 4. First, we examine the base case, which is similar to the scenario described in [4] , and then we perform sensitivity analysis. Section 5 contains the summary and conclusions.
The Epidemic and the Possible Interventions
We consider a situation where a malevolent agent engages a population with an act of terror by releasing the smallpox virus in a public area. This act of terror is clandestine, and the authorities are not aware of the event until a certain number of symptomatic patients are reported and diagnosed as carrying the disease. Once the epidemic is detected and identified, a response is initiated, which involves isolation, quarantine, tracing contacts and vaccinating some or all of the population. The disease has an incubation period before an infected individual becomes symptomatic. During the incubation period the infected individuals are not infectious, and therefore the disease is not transmitted to others. The incubation period is divided into two periods of time: the immunable (also called vaccine sensitive) period and the non-immunable period. During the immunable period, vaccination is effective. It will eradicate the disease from an infective at that stage with high probability. During the non-immunable period, vaccination is not effective, and therefore the infective will eventually become ill. Once the incubation period is over, the infected individual becomes infectious. The infectious period lasts as long as the symptoms still persist. As in [4] , the transmission of the disease is in the form of homogeneous mixing. additional effort that is required to trace contacts, the service rate at the tracing queue is lower than that at the general queue. The tracing service reduction factor is the ratio between the service rates at the general queue and tracing queue. We assume that a certain portion of the vaccination capacity is allocated to the tracing queue and the rest is applied to the general queue.
The set of contacts that are named by a certain index case is called the index set. Let is somewhat wasteful since there is no race to trace. The susceptible individuals in J i (2) can be vaccinated in the more efficient general (mass) queue. Tracing individuals in J i (1) is clearly a waste of tracing capacity. Thus,
and the tracing queue is generated by
To properly represent the effective vaccination rate at the tracing queue we need to , we assume that the cardinality of J i is constant and equal to M for all index case i. Also, since we assume homogeneous mixing, that is, all index cases are identical with respect to the transmission process, the cardinality of P i is also constant and is equal to N for all index cases iE ∈ .
However, unlike M that stays constant throughout the epidemic (e.g., M = 50 in [4] ), N changes over time as the epidemic progresses and therefore it is denoted by N(t). As in [4] , we assume that M = N(t) for all t, that is, the size of the index set always exceeds the number of PT infectives. Finally, let ? 0 denote the probability that a PT infective is (newly) named by the corresponding index.
Note that the total number of PT infectives at time t is Q 1 (t)N(t), where Q 1 (t) is the number of index cases that are detected and interviewed at time t. Similarly, Q 1 (t)M is the total number of names gene rated at time t by the index cases. We assume that M represents the net number of new ly named contacts. Therefore, the index sets are disjoint.
Let () t ω denote the fraction of the index set that contains newly named infectives.
Since there are no reliable estimates for 0 ω , we will first assign, in the base case, a reasonable value for this parameter, and then we will perform a full-scale sensitivity analysis in Section 4.
The definitions in (2) are used as a backdrop for the more generalized definitions in Section 3.
Note that MVP and TVP generate only one queue each-general queue in MVP and tracing queue in TVP. The vaccination process that is proposed in this paper-PVP, which is described in the next section-generates both queues. D -Epidemic detection threshold.
Definitions and Derivations of Transitions
The infection rate is given by
where R 0 is the average number of infections generated by an infectious individual early in the epidemic (also called basic reproductive ratio [16] ), E(I) is the mean duration of the infectious stage, and S(0) is the size of the population at the beginning of the epidemic.
The tracing rate is
The tracing rate is affected by the tracing capacity which is a fraction q of the overall available vaccination capacity V(t).
The tracing queue is given by the following recursive equation:
where Q 1 (t) is the number of new index cases at time t.
The number of newly named infectives in the tracing queue is given recursively by 00 0
The sum 00 ()() AtBt + is the total number of PT infectives at time t.
The vaccination rate in the general queue is, 00 0 ()()() ()1,.
()()()()() (1) 
Note that the general queue may include individuals that are susceptible, non-PT (both immunable and non-immunable), and PT not newly named.
Let, () ().
()
() t ω is the estimated fraction of the tracing capacity that is applied to newly named PT infectives. It can be seen that (9) is a natural generalization of (2) 
The rate at which pre-PT infectives become PT depends on the rate at which infectious individual become index cases. β is the probability that an infectious individual, who is currently at the j-th day of his/her infectious period (I), will be detected and isolated l days from now. Notice that if l
Based on our assumption of homogeneous free mixing, the probability u l (t) that an individual who got infected on day t will become PT on day t+l is, 
Thus, the probability w j (t) that a pre-PT infective who is at the j-th day of the incubation period at day t, will become PT at t+1 is, 
The Difference Equations
The following set of difference equations describes the epidemic progression in case of intervention: ( 
(1)[()()()][1()()](1(t))

1)(()(1())()())(1()()) (()(1())()())(1()(1)(()()))
Explanation of the Equations
First we observe that the vaccination rates are as follows: a fraction 0 ω of the PT infectives-the newly named infectives-are vaccinated at a rate r t (t), while the rest of the population is vaccinated at a rate r G (t) + r
+ (t). Recall that the parameter () rt
+ is the residual portion 1-() t ω of the trace vaccination capacity that is applied to ("wasted" on) individuals that are not newly named PT infectives.
Equation (15):
The remaining susceptibles are those who have not been vaccinated nor infected.
Equations (16), (17):
The newly infected are among those who have not been vaccinated neither in the general queue nor by the residual tracing capacity. The parameter u 1 (t) is the probability that a newly infected becomes immediately PT.
Equation (18):
The immunable pre-PT infectives are those who have not been vaccinated (neither in the general queue nor by the residual tracing capacity), are still
) and have not become PT (1-w j (t)). 
Equation (19): The immunable PT infectives at time
Equations (24): This equation records the total number of the non-immunable infectives.
We need the two representations of stage B cohort ( (21)- (23) and (24)) because of the fact that vaccinating individuals at that stage is ineffective; they will eventually become sick. Thus, (21)- (23) are needed for determining the vaccination queue sizes for pre-PT,
PT, and post-PT infectives, while (24) counts the individuals who will eventually become infectious (see Equation (25)).
Equation (25):
The newly infectious individuals comprise infectives whose incubation period has ended.
Equation (26):
The remaining infectious individuals at stage I are those who have not been detected and isolated yet.
Equation (27): The newly isolated infectious individuals (new index cases) are those
who have been detected.
Equation (28):
The remaining individuals in isolation are those who have not been removed yet (recovery or death).
The model that has been described above is general and can represent several vaccination policies. Specifically, once the vaccination process has been initiated, the In TVP, ()0 for all , and (),()0
The PVP policy is a combination of mass vaccination and trace vaccination where at all times treating the tracing queue preempts the general queue. Whenever there are new index cases, an appropriate vaccination capacity is allocated for tracing and vaccinating the generated named contacts (Index Set). The tracing/vaccination capacity allocated to the tracing queue is limited only by the total existing vaccination capacity, that is, q = 1.
Mass vaccination is carried on with the remaining vaccination capacity. The parameter c, the tracing service reduction factor, quantifies the inefficiencies that result from the tracing process.
Analysis
The model developed in Section 3 is applied now to evaluate the effectiveness of the prioritized vaccination process (PVP) in comparison with the mass vaccination process (MVP) and the trace vaccination process (TVP). Recall that in PVP the first priority is for the tracing queue, and the remaining vaccination capacity is applied to the general queue.
An individual is treated in the general queue only if he is not claimed by the tracing queue.
Base Case
Whenever it is relevant, the parameters chosen for the base case are similar to those in [4] . We also assume for this case that the values of the parameters remain constant throughout the duration of the epidemic. In particular, there are no special initial conditions. The values of the various epidemic, population, and operational parameters are shown in Table 4 .1. Table 4 .2 presents the characteristics of the probability mass functions of the time parameters. These probability distributions are consistent with the assumptions in [4] and the data in [8] . The probability distributions in Table 4 .2 are also consistent with the limited data regarding the probable durations of the various stages that are reported mainly in [17] and [18] .
Value
The results corresponding to the base case are summarized in Table 4 MVP results in a relatively large number of second-wave infected individuals, but the epidemic is eradicated much faster than when TVP is executed. In TVP, the epidemic has initially smaller peaks than in MVP, but it is expanding gradually over a longer period of time (in the base case, the epidemic reaches its peak on day 159). In PVP, the epidemic has smaller peaks than in TVP and its duration is about the same as in MVP.
Discussion
The PVP is clearly more effective than the two other vaccination policies in the base case. It results in over 50% less derived infections (second wave and later infections that result from the initial attack of 1,000 infected) compared to MVP, and over 99% less derived infections compared to TVP. In both PVP and MVP, the epidemic is eradicated (and the entire population is inoculated) after almost two months. In the TVP case, the epidemic lasts a little over one year. The peak isolation/quarantine capacity needed for the PVP is less than 60% the peak capacity needed for MVP. The extra capacity needed in the MVP case is required relatively early in the epidemic since the first waves of infection may not be captured by the untargeted homogeneous vaccination process. In TVP and PVP, the vaccination is targeted at high-risk susceptibles, and therefore more stage-A individuals may be located and vaccinated at the early stages of the epidemic.
However, the lack of massive vaccination in TVP results in prolonging and expanding the epidemic and thus increasing the total number infected. The peak isolation capacity in the Implementing PVP will require a flexible response system in which resources are distributed smoothly and effectively between the mass and trace vaccination queues.
Enabling this flexibility may require structural and operational considerations when setting up the vaccination system. Specifically, deploying share resources such as medical personnel, must be planned carefully to obtain maximum utilization.
Sensitivity Analyses
Is the evident dominance of PVP over MVP and TVP robust? Does it dominate for other sets of parameters?
To address these questions we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to some key parameters. Since in most cases TVP turns out to be inferior to PVP and MVP by almost two orders of magnitude, the comparisons in the following will focus at MVP and PVP only. The number of infectives shown in the analysis excludes those who were initially infected by the bioattack ( 1 (0) A − ).
Tracing Service Reduction Factor -c
In the base case, we assumed that the tracing process consumes four times the vaccination resources needed for mass vaccination, that is, c = 4. This value is adopted from [4] . Arguably, the larger the value of c, the lower the relative efficiency of the tracing process, and thus the less likely it is that PVP will outperform MVP. Obviously, the varying of c does not affect the MVP, since there is no tracing activity.
For PVP, the number of infected increases from 990 (c = 1). The break-even value of the tracing service Reduction Factor for PVP compared to MVP is c = 65. In other words, the tracing service rate must be more than 65 times slower than the general vaccination rate to render MVP more effective. 
Epidemic Detection Threshold -D
One would expect that the effectiveness of the response process will depend on the situational awareness of the healthcare system. The faster the outbreak of the epidemic is detected, the earlier response actions can be taken, and therefore fewer i nfected cases would be expected. 
Daily Nominal Vaccination Capacity -V
The results are sensitive to the assumption regarding the effective daily vaccination capacity, which is assumed here to be fixed over time. 
Tracing Effectiveness -ω 0
This parameter reflects the efficiency of the t racing process. It is the maximum possible probability to trace an infective. In the base case, we assumed that this efficiency cannot exceed 70%. Clearly, the lower the upper bound, the less advantageous are PVP
and TVP compared to MVP. 
Effect of Initial Conditions
During the initial stages of the epidemic some of the parameters may have different values than later on in the epidemic. We consider here three such parameters: the daily vaccination capacity V, the infection rate α, and the distribution function of the duration of the infectious period P I (j). Due to set-up time, we assume that during the first day of vaccination V(1) = 200,000 only, compared to V(t) = 500,000 t > 1. In the base case, α =10 -7 , which implies that R 0 = 3. During the first wave of infection, when the epidemic has not been detected yet, one may expect a higher infection rate. Thus, we assume that during the first wave R 0 = 4. The lack of situational awareness leads also to an extended stage I period during the first wave. Therefore, we assume that the mean time of stage I during the first wave is E(I) = 4 days, compared to three days during the rest of the epidemic period. The effect of the initial conditions is not negligible. They result in almost 90% more casualties in MVP and twice that number in PVP. It is also observed that the length of the infectious period (Stage I) distribution function has the largest single impact among the three factors that affect the initial conditions. It follows that early pre-symptomatic detection of the epidemic is crucial in any vaccination policy.
Summary and Conclusions
We have developed a new deterministic (expected-value) difference-equations model The first conclusion of the analysis is a confirmation of the general result in [4] and [5] ; that is, mass vaccination is far more effective than trace vaccination. The second conclusion is that the prioritized vaccination policy is superior to the mass vaccination policy for any set of realistic parameters. Moreover, since the PVP "wastes" vaccination resources on tracing, one may argue that the tradeoff between MVP and PVP may be sensitive to the assumption regarding the service tracing service reduction factor (c) that reflects the degradation in the vaccination rate due to tracing. It is shown that this is not the case; PVP is more effective than MVP even if this ratio is higher than 60. It is also noted that the advantage of PVP over MVP increases as the vaccination resources become more limited (see Figure 4 .5). The effectiveness of the PVP is also relatively insensitive to the size of the index set M. Tracing as low as five individuals per index case may be sufficient for obtaining satisfactory results. Finally, it is noted that initial awareness to such an attack, which may reduce the length of the first generation infectious stage (I),
can have a significant effect on the total number of infected individuals. From the logistical point of view, the maximum daily isolation capacity that is needed for MVP is considerably higher than the capacity needed for PVP.
Recall that the model presented here assumes homogeneous mixing. This assumption may not be realistic in many possible scenarios. An interesting question is if the preference of PVP over MVP is sensitive to that assumption. As a first cut at analyzing this issue, we decrease the basic reproductive ratio R 0 , which is equal 3 at the base case. Future work in response-policy analysis must take into account spatial and social effects. The newly emerging concept of "small world" network [19] may be utilized to model these effects.
